Random Access for Machine-Type Communication based on Bloom Filtering by Pratas, Nuno K. et al.
Random Access for Machine-Type Communication
based on Bloom Filtering
Nuno K. Pratas, Cˇedomir Stefanovic´, Germa´n Corrales Maduen˜o, Petar Popovski
Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Denmark
Email: {nup,cs,gco,petarp}@es.aau.dk
Abstract—We present a random access method inspired on
Bloom filters that is suited for Machine-Type Communications
(MTC). Each accessing device sends a signature during the
contention process. A signature is constructed using the Bloom
filtering method and contains information on the device identity
and the connection establishment cause. We instantiate the pro-
posed method over the current LTE-A access protocol. However,
the method is applicable to a more general class of random access
protocols that use preambles or other reservation sequences,
as expected to be the case in 5G systems. We show that our
method utilizes the system resources more efficiently and achieves
significantly lower connection establishment latency in case of
synchronous arrivals, compared to the variant of the LTE-A
access protocol that is optimized for MTC traffic. A dividend
of the proposed method is that it allows the base station (BS)
to acquire the device identity and the connection establishment
cause already in the initial phase of the connection establishment,
thereby enabling their differentiated treatment by the BS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine-type communications (MTC) are typically char-
acterized by a massive number of machine-type devices that
connect to the network to transmit small data payloads. Those
features present a significant challenge to cellular networks,
whose radio access part is traditionally designed to deal with a
rather low number of connections with high data requirements.
Specifically, current cellular networks, such as LTE-A, are
connection-oriented [1], requiring a connection establishment
between the device and the Base Station (BS) before the device
can transmit its data packet. As an example, the connection
establishment in LTE-A involves a high amount of signaling
overhead, which is particularly emphasized when the data
payload is small, e.g., less than 1000 bytes [2]. Therefore,
in 3GPP it was proposed an approach to optimize the con-
nection establishment by reducing the signaling overhead [3].
The resulting simplified connection establishment protocol
starts with the contention-based Access Reservation Protocol
(ARP) [4], depicted in the first four steps in Fig. 1(a), followed
by a fifth message where the signaling and a small data
payload are concatenated. The signaling exchanges related to
the security mechanisms are omitted in the optimized version
of the LTE-A connection establishment, by reusing an a-priori
established security context [2].
The throughput and blocking probability of the ARP are
rather sensitive to the number of contending devices. Specifi-
cally, the devices contend for access by sending their pream-
bles in a designated and periodically occurring uplink sub-
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Fig. 1. (a) LTE-A connection establishment protocol optimized for MTC [3]
and (b) signature-based modification of LTE-A connection establishment.
frame, here termed as random access opportunity (RAO).
When the number of contending devices is high [5], multiple
devices activate the same preamble in a RAO, which leads to
collisions of their RRC Connection Requests, see Fig. 1(a).
Consequently, most devices are unable to establish a connec-
tion in the first attempt and perform subsequent attempts that,
due to the high load, are also likely to result in collisions. A
solution put forward to cope with congestion, was the extended
access class barring (EAB) [6], where certain classes of
devices are temporally blocked from participating in the ARP,
but at the cost of an increased access latency to those same
devices. Another drawback of the ARP is that the network
learns the devices’ identities and connection establishment
causes only after the RRC Connection Request is successfully
received, as the contention is performed via randomly chosen
preambles that do not carry information. A solution that
allows the network to learn the identities and connection
establishment causes of the contending devices already at
the beginning of the ARP, could enable their differentiated
treatment in later phases of the connection establishment and
even skip some of the steps in the LTE-A random access
protocol, as indicated in Fig. 1.
In this paper we propose a new access method based on
signatures and Bloom filtering [7]. The method is demon-
strated in the context of the LTE-A ARP, however, we note
that it can be employed in the next generation ARPs [8]
following similar principles. In the proposed method, instead
of contending with a single preamble in a RAO, the devices
contend by transmitting a predefined sequence of preambles in
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a frame composed of several RAOs, The transmitted sequence
of preambles is denoted as the device signature. The presented
ideas are a conceptual extension of the work [9], where the
devices contend for access by selecting a random signature,
generated by combining random preambles over consecutive
RAOs. In contrast, in the method described here, each device
contends with a unique signature generated using the Interna-
tional Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the device and its
connection establishment cause, in further text referred to as
the device’s identification.1 Specifically, we apply the Bloom-
filter [7] principles for signature generation, where the device’s
identification is hashed over multiple independent hash func-
tions and the resulting output used to select which preamble in
which RAO to activate. We introduce an analytical framework
through which we tune the signature properties, i.e., its length
and the number of activated preambles, based on the number
of expected arrivals and the target efficiency of the use of
system resources, denoted as the goodput. We also investigate
the expected latency and signature detection probability of the
proposed method. Finally, we show that, when the arrivals
are synchronous, the proposed method outperforms the LTE-
A connection establishment procedure in terms of goodput,
while achieving similar or lower average latency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the standard ARP in LTE-A. Section III describes
the proposed access method and Section IV presents the
corresponding analysis. Section V evaluates the performance
of the proposed method, comparing it with the reference LTE-
A procedure for MTC traffic. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. LTE-A ACCESS RESERVATION PROCEDURE
A successful LTE-A access reservation entails the exchange
of four messages2, as depicted in Fig. 1(a). Initially, a device
randomly chooses a preamble to be transmitted in a RAO
from a set of available preambles generated using Zadoff-
Chu sequences [10]. The preambles are orthogonal and can
be simultaneously detected by the BS. We also note that the
BS is able to detect a preamble even when it is transmitted
by multiple devices [1], [9], i.e., a collision in the “preamble
space” is still interpreted as an activated preamble. This rep-
resents a logical OR operation, since the preamble is detected
as activated if there is at least one device that transmits
the preamble. This observation motivates the use of Bloom
filter, a data structure based on OR operation for testing set
membership.
The devices whose preambles are detected are notified
via a Random Access Response (RAR) in the downlink and
assigned a temporary network identifier. The reception of the
RAR triggers the transmission of the RRC Connection Request
in the allocated uplink sub-frame. At this point, the BS is able
to detect the collision of the multiple connection requests, sent
by the devices that originally sent the same preamble. The
1We note that the proposed method can be straightforwardly applied to
cases where some other information is used for signature generation.
2For the sake of brevity, we omit the details that are nonessential for the
proposed method, such as the power ramping procedure etc.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the mapping of the LTE-A preambles into a signature
frame composed by multiple RAOs.
successfully received connection requests are acknowledged,
marking the start of the data transmission phase. On the other
hand, the devices whose connection requests collided, do not
receive the feedback and either contend again by sending
a new preamble or end up in outage when the number of
connection attempts reaches the predefined limit. In the RRC
Connection Request, the device informs the network of its
temporary identifier, IMSI, and the connection establishment
cause. From these, the network can confirm if the device is
authorized for access, track the device’s subscribed services
and reestablish the preexisting security context [2].
As already mentioned, the channel over which the devices
contend can be modeled as an OR multiple access channel
(OR-MAC). By A = {ai, i = 0, 1, ...,M}, denote the set of
available preambles, where the absence of preamble activation
is denoted by the idle preamble a0. Assume that there are T
devices in total. We model the contention by assuming that
the device h, h = 1, . . . , T , transmits a binary word
x(h) = [x
(h)
0 , x
(h)
1 , · · · , x(h)M ], (1)
where bit x(h) = 1 indicates if the device h transmitted
preamble ai. Note that only a single entry x
(h)
i , 0 ≤ i ≤ M ,
can be set to 1 since a device can only transmit a single
preamble in a single RAO. The BS observes
y =
T⊕
h=1
xˆ(h), (2)
where
⊕
denotes a bit-wise OR operator and xˆ(h) is the
detected binary word of device h. In particular, the BS detects
a transmitted preamble with probability pd ≤ 1 and with
probability pf ≥ 0 falsely detects a non-transmitted preamble,
which may cause that x(h) 6= xˆ(h). In practice, the preamble
detection at the BS should ensure that pd > 0.99 and
pf < 10
−3 [11]3. Finally, every non-zero entry in y implies
a detection of the corresponding preamble. Obviously, in the
best-case scenario, the BS can detect up to M different devices
in a RAO.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The essence of the proposed method lies in the idea of
devices contending with combinations of K preambles trans-
3The pd requirement in [11] corresponds to the single activation of a
preamble. When a preamble is activated by multiple devices it is expected
that the effective pd will be higher [1].
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Fig. 3. Example of: (a) synchronous transmission of 3 signatures when
L = 3 and M = 3 and (b) erroneous decoding of a signature which was not
present in the original transmission (pd = 1 and pf = 0).
mitted over L RAOs, denoted as signatures. Each preamble of
a signature is sent in a separate RAO, while L RAOs define a
signature frame, see Fig. 2. Extending the model introduced in
Section II, the device h contends by transmitting its signature
s(h) = [x
(h)
1 ,x
(h)
2 , · · · ,x(h)L ], (3)
where the binary words x(h)i , i = 1, . . . , L, follow the
structure introduced in (1). Obviously, the number of available
signatures is
(
L
K
)
MK , potentially allowing for the detection
of exponentially more contenders compared to the case in
which the preambles sent in each of the L RAOs are treated
independently and where the maximal number of detected
contenders is L ·M .
Similarly to (2), the BS observes
y =
N⊕
h=1
sˆ(h), (4)
where sˆ(h) is the detected version of s(h). The BS decodes all
signatures s for which the following holds
s = s
⊗
y, (5)
where
⊗
is the bit-wise AND.
At this point, we turn to a phenomenon intrinsically related
to the proposed contention method [9]. Namely, even in the
case of perfect preamble detection (pd = 1) and no false
detections (pf = 0), the BS may also decode signatures that
have not been transmitted but for which (5) also holds. In other
words, the BS may decode false positives. An example of this
is shown in Fig. 3. The performance of the random signature
construction in terms of probability of decoding false positives
was first analyzed in [9], where they are referred to as phantom
sequences. On the other hand, there is an extensive work on
the construction of OR-MAC signatures [12] based on the
following criterion: if up to N -out-of-T signatures are active,
then there are no false positives. However, these constructions
are not directly applicable to the LTE-A access, as they would
(1) require that a device sends multiple preambles in the
same RAO, and (2) imply rather long signature lengths, i.e.,
N2 log2 T
2M log2N
≤ L ≤ N2 log2 TM ln 2 , which implies an increased access
latency. Inspired by Bloom filters [7], we propose a novel
signature construction that uses much lower signature lengths,
at the expense of introducing false positives in a controlled
manner.
Signature Construction based on Bloom Filtering
In the proposed method, the device signature is constructed
in such a way that it provides a representation of the device’s
identification, which is assumed to be a-priori known to the
network. To illustrate how a signature is constructed, we first
consider the case where a single preamble is available at each
of the L RAOs dedicated to the signature transmission, i.e.,
M = 1. Taking the view of the device h, we start with the
binary array s(h) of length L, indexed from 1 to L, where
all the bits are initially set to 0. We then activate K index
positions in this array, i.e., we set them to 1; note that K is a
predefined constant valid for all devices. This is done by using
K independent hash functions, fj(uh), j = 1, . . . ,K, whose
output is an integer value between 1 and L, corresponding to
an index position in the array, and where u(h) is representation
of the device identity. The resulting binary array becomes the
device signature. This construction follows the same steps as
the object insertion operation in a Bloom filter [7].
When M > 1, the signature construction occurs in two
stages. The first stage corresponds to the selection of the K
active RAOs using hash functions fj(uh), j = 1, . . . ,K, as
described previously. In the second stage, for each of the
activated RAOs, a contending device selects and transmits
randomly one of M preambles. This is performed by hashing
the device identity using another set of independent hash
functions gj(uh), j = 1, . . . ,K, i.e., a separate hash function
for each RAO, whose output is an integer between 1 and M
that corresponds to one of the available preambles.
Signature-Based ARP
The signature-based access reservation protocol is depicted
in Fig. 1(b), which starts by the devices transmitting their
signatures. Upon the successful decoding of a signature, the
BS transmits the RRC Connection Setup message. In contrast
with the LTE-A ARP depicted in Fig. 1(a), the messages 2
and 3 are not required in the signature based access, since the
BS is able to determine from the signature the IMSI of the
device and the connection establishment cause. The protocol
concludes with the transmission of the small data payload
together with the completion of the RRC connection message.
Practical Considerations
The described signature generation raises two important
issues: (i) out of K hash functions fj(uh), j = 1, . . . ,K,
there is a probability of 1 −K!(LK)/LK that at least two of
these functions generating the same output, leading to less than
K distinct RAOs active in a signature; (ii) there is a non-zero
probability that two or more devices share the same signature,
given by
T∑
i=2
(
T
i
)
pi(1− p)T−i with p =
[(
L
K
)
(M)K
]−1
(6)
Algorithm 1: Signature generation for hth device, where
u(h) is the device’s identification and x(h)i,m indicates acti-
vation of mth preamble in ith RAO of the signature s(h).
1 Input: u(h), L, M , K;
2 Initialize: s(h) ← 0, L← 1...L, M← 1...M ;
3 for j : 1 · · ·K do
4 i← L(mod(u(h), L+ 1− j));
5 L = L \ {i};
6 m←M(mod(u(h),M + 1− j));
7 M =M \ {m};
8 x
(h)
i,m = 1;
9 Output s(h);
and T as the total number of devices. The above probabilities
can be minimized by increasing the signature length L, which
is the reason why these issues are commonly ignored within
the Bloom filter related literature, where L is of the order of
104. Although we do not use such large ranges for L, we note
that for values of L > 10 and 5 < K < L that are used in the
performance evaluation in Section V, the second probability
can be neglected, as in this case T  (LK)(M)K .
The first issue can be addressed by a signature construction
that enforces K distinct active RAOs per signature. We provide
in Alg. 1 a description of a practical signature construction
that uses the modulus operation as basis for the hashing.
This construction ensures that K distinct RAOs are active per
signature, by removing the RAOs selected in previous itera-
tions from the set of available RAOs. Further, the preambles
activated in previously selected RAOs are removed from the
set preambles available for the next iteration. This operation
limits the generation of signatures to K ≤ min(M,L) active
RAOs; however, this is within the operating range of interest
where K < M and allows us to apply probabilistic tools, as
presented in the analysis in Section IV, to design the signatures
length L and number of active RAOs K. As it will be shown
in Section V, the proposed signature generation algorithm
matches well the derived analytical model.
Finally, we note that an essential prerequisite for the pro-
posed signature access scheme is that the signature generation
algorithm and all the hash functions are known to all devices,
including the BS. This can be accomplished via the existing
periodic broadcasts that include the network configuration; an
alternative would be to include this information already in the
device’s subscriber identity module.
IV. ANALYSIS
We analyze a single instance of the contention process,
assuming a synchronous batch arrival of Na devices. We
assume that the probability of an arrival of a device is
pa = E[Na]/T , and denote the expected number of arrivals as
N = E[Na]. The parameters of the proposed scheme are the
signature frame size, denoted by L, the number of active RAOs
in the signature, denoted by K, and the number of preambles
per RAO that are available for signature construction, denoted
by M . The first two parameters are subject to design, and
we analyze their dimensioning when on average N -out-of-T
signatures are active, such that the false positive rate is below
a threshold. In contrast, M is assumed to be fixed, which
corresponds to the typical scenario in LTE-A systems.
We start by establishing the relationship between the cor-
rectly detected signatures and all detected signatures, which
also includes the false positives, after all the contenders have
completed 3rd step of the proposed method, see Fig. 1(b).
We denote this metric as the goodput G. In essence, the
goodput reflects the efficiency of the subsequent small data
transmission, as the BS will also attempt to serve the falsely
detected signatures. The expected goodput is
E [G] = E
[
Na
Na + P
]
≈ E[Na]
E[Na] + E[P ]
=
N
N + E[P ]
. (7)
where P is the number of false positives. From (7) it follows
N
T
≤ E[G] ≤ 1, (8)
as there can be no more than T detected signatures. The mean
number of false positives E[P ] can be approximated as
E[P ] ≈ pfa(T −N),
where T − N corresponds to the mean number of inactive
signatures, while pfa denotes the false positive probability,
i.e., the probability of an inactive signature being perceived
as active. Eq. (7) now becomes
E [G] ≈ N
N + pfa(T −N) . (9)
Using (9), we proceed by setting the target goodput Gˆ and
establishing the relation between Gˆ and the corresponding
target pˆfa
pˆfa =
N(1− Gˆ)
(T −N)Gˆ . (10)
To compute pfa, we rely on approximations that hold when
the number of simultaneously active signatures N is high
enough. Specifically, pfa is the probability that all K preambles
associated with an inactive signature, are detected as activated
by the BS. Each of these K preambles can be (i) actually
activated by an active signature and detected as such by the
BS, or (ii) not activated by any of the active signatures, but
falsely detected as activated by the BS. Now, the probability
that a particular preamble in a particular RAO is not activated
by any of the signatures, denoted by pidle, is
pidle =
(
1− K
L ·M
)N
, (11)
where L·M is the total number of preambles in L RAOs, K is
the number of preamble activations per user, N is the number
of active signatures, and it is assumed that the selection of
any preamble in any RAO is equally likely. The detection of
a preamble is non-ideal and therefore we have to distinguish
between two events: (i) detection of a preamble transmitted by
Algorithm 2: Iterative signature decoding where S is the
set of signatures and D is the set of decoded signatures.
1 Input: S, y, L, M , K;
2 Initialize: V = S, D = ∅;
3 for i : 1 · · ·LM do
4 for s(h) ∈ V \D do
5 if s(h)(1 : i) 6= s(h)(1 : i)⊗y(1 : i) then
6 V = V \ {s(h)};
7 if
(
V \ s(h)(1 : i))⊗y(1 : i) 6= y(1 : i) then
8 D = D ∪ {s(h)};
9 Report to u(h) that s(h) is decoded;
10 for s(h) ∈ V \D do
11 D = D∪ {s(h)}; Report to u(h) that s(h) is decoded;
at least one device with probability pd; (ii) false detection of a
non-transmitted preamble with probability pf . We approximate
pfa as
pfa
(a)≈ [(1− pidle) · pd + pidle · pf ]K (12)
= [pd + (pf − pd) · pidle]K ,
and where (a) becomes a lower bound when M = 1 and
pd = 1 and pf = 0 [13]. From (12), the required signature
frame size Lˆ to meet the target pˆfa is
Lˆ =
K
M
1−( pˆ1/Kfa − pd
pf − pd
)1/N−1 (13)
To compute the K that minimizes Lˆ in (13), we assume
pd = 1 and pf = 0. Then, for a given N and L, the value of
K that minimizes pfa is given by [14]
Kmin =
L ·M
N
ln 2 (14)
We use (14) to find the minimal required Lˆ via (13). Further-
more, recall that each device can only activate up to a single
preamble per RAO, resulting in the constraint
Kmin = L min
(
1,
M
N
ln 2
)
, (15)
where we assume to work in the regime in which MN ln 2 < 1,
i.e., where N > M ln 2. Now, the minimum Lˆ can be ob-
tained by solving iteratively the following fixed-point equation
obtained from combining (13) and (14)
Lˆ =
⌈
dKmine
M
1−(p1/dKminefa − pd
pf − pd
)1/N−1⌉, (16)
which converges for pd ≥ 0.99 and pf ≤ 10−3, i.e., the
prescribed preamble detection performance [11].
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the number of potentially active and already decoded
signatures by the BS as the RAOs of the signature frame elapse, for T =
1000, N = 200, Gˆ = 0.99, pd = 0.99, pf = 10−3, and Lˆ = 47 from (16).
A. Signature Decoding
A straightforward approach for signature decoding is to
perform it after all RAOs of the signature frame have been
received, i.e., after the BS has observed the whole signature
frame. An alternative is to perform the decoding iteratively
after every received signature RAO, i.e., the BS attempts to
decode a signature while only having access to a partial ob-
servation of the signature frame. The latter strategy is inspired
with the fact that K active RAOs constituting a signature are
randomly spread over the signature frame and, in principle,
the BS does not have to wait until the end of the frame to
detect a signature. The decoding performance is the same for
both strategies when all L RAOs in the signature frame have
been received, but the average latency in the latter approach
is lower. We provide in Alg. 2 an algorithmic description of
the iterative signature decoding, where the notation z(1 : i)
corresponds to the first i entries of vector z. The key steps
of the Alg. 2 are steps 5 and 7. In particular, in step 5
the BS discards the signatures that could not have generated
the partial observation y(1 : i) from the set of potentially
active signatures V . Obviously, it is expected that V will
decrease with the additional received RAOs. In step 7, the BS
detects the signatures whose combinations of active RAOs and
preambles are uniquely contributing to the partial observation
y(1 : i). Then the BS reports to the respective device that
its signature has been decoded, which in the LTE-A protocol
realization would correspond to the RRC Connection Setup
message, as shown in Fig. 1(b). Finally, in steps 10–12, when
all RAOs have been received, the BS reports all the signatures
within the set V \D as decoded.
In Fig. 4, we provide a simulation snapshot showing how
many signatures are considered potentially active and how
many have actually been decoded as the RAOs of the signa-
ture frame elapse. Obviously, the iterative signature decoding
occurs in a spread manner, which leads to the spreading
of the feedback messages acknowledging the decoding of
each signature, i.e., the RRC Connection Setup message in
Fig. 1(b). In this way, the scenario in which a high number
of devices attempt to complete the access reservation protocol
simultaneously is avoided, i.e., the occurrence of congestion
at the later stages of the ARP is reduced. Another important
observation is that most of the signatures become decoded well
before the end of the signature frame.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Scenario description
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed sig-
nature based access and compare it with the proposed 3GPP
LTE-A solution for MTC traffic [2], we have implemented an
event driven simulator where the main downlink and uplink
LTE channels are modeled. Specifically, the simulator imple-
ments the both procedures depicted in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b),
while the downlink control and data channels (PDCCH and
PDSCH respectively) and the uplink data and random access
channels (PUSCH and PRACH) are modeled as in [2].
We consider a typical cell, configured with one RAO every
1 ms, M = 54 available preambles for contention [2]. We
assume a total population of size T = 1000, and a batch
arrival of Na devices with a payload of 100 bytes to transmit,
The arrival probability of an individual device is given by pa =
N/T , i.e., Na is a binomially distributed random variable with
mean E[Na] = N . The mean number of arrivals N is assumed
to be known, and the signature based scheme is dimensioned
for it.4 The probability of preamble detection by the BS is
set to pd = 0.99 and the probability of false detection of a
preamble is set to pf = 10−3 [11].
In the baseline, i.e., 3GPP scheme, we assume the typical
values for the backoff window of 20 ms and the maximum
number of 10 connection attempts [2]. The devices upon
becoming active contend for access by activating randomly
one preamble in one of the available RAOs within the backoff
interval, i.e., the batch arrival is spread with the backoff
interval.5 In case that a device is the only one that selected
a given preamble in a given RAO and that this preamble
has been detected, then the access procedure, as depicted in
Fig 1(a), proceeds until completion. Otherwise, the device will
reattempt the access within the back-off window after the timer
to receive the RAR as elapsed. When multiple devices select
the same preamble within a RAO, the resources assigned by
the BS corresponding to the step 3 in the protocol are wasted
due to the collided devices; and the collided devices re-attempt
access later by selecting a random RAO within the backoff
interval. The devices re-attempt access until either successful
or until exceeding the allowed number of retransmissions.
In the proposed method, the devices contend by transmitting
their signatures, where the signature frame length L is obtained
from (16). For the sake of comparison, we also evaluate the
performance of the random signature construction [9], where
K = L. Each device upon its signature being decoded,
even in the case of false positive, receives the feedback
4N can be estimated, e.g., using techniques that take advantage of the
LTE-A ARP, such as the one proposed in [15].
5Note that this initial backoff is a modification of the original LTE-A access
procedure, in which the devices contend by activating a preamble in the
nearest RAO [16]. The purpose of this modification is to force a spread in
the batch arrival and prevent the consequent imminent collision; the resulting
performance of the baseline scheme is actually better than it could be expected.
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RRC connection setup message and is assigned uplink data
resources for the transmission of the third and final message,
see Fig 1(b).
The performance is evaluated in terms of: (i) the average
goodput E[G]; (ii) the average latency until the first step in
both access schemes is successful, corresponding to a singleton
preamble in the baseline and a successfully decoded signature
in the proposed scheme; (iii) the average latency until the small
data transmission takes place, corresponding to step 5 in the
baseline and to step 3 in the proposed scheme, see Fig 1; and
(iv) probability of device being successfully detected upon the
completion of the access protocol.
The average goodput E[G] is evaluated as the ratio between
the successfully used resources and the total resources spent in
the third step of both access protocols. It directly relates to the
efficient use of resources, since the BS is only able to discern if
there is a correctly detected device upon successful completion
of the third step. In the baseline scheme, the system resources
are wasted whenever two or more devices select the same
preamble within a RAO; the goodput in this case is given as the
ratio between the total number of messages that are exchanged
successfully and the total number of exchanged messages at
the third step, including the failed ones due to collisions. In
the case of the signature based access, the wasted resources in
the third step occur whenever a false positive signature occurs,
and the goodput is given by (7).
B. Results
The expected goodput is depicted in Fig. 5, where for
the goodput target for the proposed method (10) is set to
Gˆ = 0.99. We observe that the proposed method meets the
actual goodput meets the design target at higher access loads.
On the other hand, at lower N , the performance deviates from
the target value Gˆ = 0.99. This is due to the assumption that
the false positive signatures are independently and uniformly
generated from the idle signatures, which is the basis of the
approximation in (12). We can also observe that the goodput
performance of the proposed method is always superior to
the 3GPP scheme. Specifically, In the 3GPP scheme the
devices re-attempt retransmission upon colliding and until
they are either successful or the number of retransmissions
is exceeded. Each subsequent failed retransmission results
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Fig. 6. Mean latency of the 3GPP scheme, random signature construction
and the proposed signature construction with optimal K and minimum Lˆ
computed from (16), at different stages of the access procedures. (T = 1000)
in additional wasted system resources, which results in the
observed degradation of the baseline goodput with increasing
number of active devices. Finally, the goodput achieved with
the random signature construction [9] is quite low, due to the
high number of false positives.
In Fig. 6 we depict the mean latency at step 1 in all schemes,
as well as in steps 3 and 5 in the signature and 3GPP schemes,
respectively. An important observation is that the latency of the
proposed method is always lower than the 3GPP scheme; and
the gap between these two schemes increases for higher N .
This is a consequence of the more efficient detection of active
users, as can be seen when comparing the latency of these
two schemes at step 1. Furthermore, the random signature
construction has the worst performance, the reason being that
a signature cannot be decoded before all L RAOs of the
signature frame have been received [9].
Finally, in Tab. I we show the probability of a device
being successfully detected at end of the access protocol. Here
the proposed method has a slight performance degradation
compared to the 3GPP scheme, but this degradation dimin-
ishes higher access loads. The 3GPP scheme achieves higher
detection performance due to only requiring one transmission
out of all preamble retransmissions to be successful, making
it more robust but at the cost of lower goodput and higher
latency. On the other hand, the random signature construction
leads to a very low detection performance, as it requires the
successful detection of all the active preambles [9].
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Following the insights provided by Bloom filters, we have
introduced the concept of signatures with probabilistic guaran-
tees and applied it to a system model derived from the LTE-A
access reservation protocol. The most important feature of the
proposed method is in allowing the device to be identified
already at the access stage. Moreover, the method is very
efficient in terms of use of the system resources and has a
favorable performance in terms of decoding latency.
In the paper we assumed that the base station serves the
successfully connected devices without preferences. Neverthe-
less, it is straightforward to modify the proposed solution to
scenarios in which the BS serves devices based on the identifi-
cations inferred from the decoded signatures, i.e., IMSIs and/or
N 100 300 500 700 900
Proposed method 96 98 98 98 98
3GPP scheme 100 100 100 100 100
Random construction [9] 86 53 42 37 44
TABLE I
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFULLY DETECTING A DEVICE [%]. (T = 1000)
connection establishment causes. In such cases, the proposed
access method enables differentiated treatment by the BS from
the very beginning.
Finally, we note that in the paper we assessed a simplified
scenario of a synchronous bath arrival in order to present the
key concepts and the related analysis. Tuning the proposed
scheme for the other typical models, like the Beta arrival
model for synchronous arrivals or the Poisson arrival model
for asynchronous arrivals, is left for further work.
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